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We examined the long and short sides of Fama–French factor portfolios and found that the added value of common fac-tors is generally concentrated in the long legs. Evidence for 
the existence of various factor premiums in the equity market—such as 
the value, momentum, and low-risk premiums—is abundant.1 Standard 
academic factor portfolios take hypothetical long positions in stocks 
with attractive characteristics and combine them with short positions 
in stocks with unattractive characteristics. Therefore, factor premiums 
can be disentangled into a long-leg premium and a short-leg premium. 
For example, the Fama and French (1993) value factor (high book-to-
market stock minus low book-to-market stock, or HML) assumes long 
positions in large-capitalization (or “big”) and small-capitalization value 
stocks combined with short positions in large- and small-cap growth 
stocks, as illustrated in Figure 1. In this way, the portfolio captures not 
only the outperformance of value stocks but also the underperfor-
mance of growth stocks. The Fama–French momentum factor (winners 
minus losers, or WML), profitability factor [robust (high) operating prof-
itability minus weak (low) operating profitability, or RMW], and invest-
ment factor (companies that invest conservatively minus companies 
that invest aggressively, or CMA) are constructed by using the same 
approach, which ensures that factors are (more or less) orthogonal to 
the broad equity market and to the performance of small-cap versus 
large-cap stocks.
The long–short approach assumes that both legs contain information 
that is relevant for investor portfolios and for understanding asset 
prices. The legs may be subject to different dynamics and asset pricing 
implications, however. Numerous papers have made the argument that 
short selling faces constraints, which implies that mispricing on the 
side of overvaluation is considerably harder to correct than mispric-
ing on the side of undervaluation; see, for example, Miller (1977). 
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002); and 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2015) argued that factor premiums 
increase with limits to arbitrage, which are, arguably, more binding on 
the short side. Consequently, one might expect factor premiums to be 
stronger on the short side.
Although factor premiums originate 
in both long and short legs of factor 
portfolios, we found that (1) most 
added value comes from the long 
legs, (2) the long legs offer more 
diversification than the short legs, 
and (3) the performance of the 
short legs is generally subsumed by 
that of the long legs. These results 
are robust over size, time, and 
markets and cannot be attributed 
to differences in tail risk. We also 
found that the claim that the value 
and low-risk factors are subsumed 
by the new (post-2015) Fama–
French factors does not hold for 
the long legs of these factors.
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Empirical studies have found that the importance of 
the long and short legs does, indeed, differ and that 
their relationship is not symmetrical. For instance, 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) found that extreme negative 
returns of the momentum factor are mainly driven 
by the short side, and Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and 
Zhang (2006) found that the idiosyncratic volatil-
ity anomaly is mostly a short-side phenomenon. 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) reported that abnormal 
returns were stronger for the short-leg portfolios for 
11 anomalies selected in their study. Furthermore, 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) and Chu, Hirshleifer, and 
Ma (forthcoming) showed that short-sale constraints 
have an asymmetrical effect on the two legs of 
equity factor premiums.
In practice, shorting individual stocks is not without 
frictions. One consideration is that short positions 
involve additional costs—in particular, borrowing 
fees. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) found that 
short positions are significantly less liquid than 
long positions, with a typical short volume of about 
24% for NYSE stocks and 31% for Nasdaq stocks. 
Investors also face various implementation hurdles 
because many stocks can be sold short only to a 
limited extent, other stocks cannot be shorted at 
all, and existing short positions may unexpectedly 
be recalled; see, for example, D’Avolio (2002) and 
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002). In addition, the 
stocks that are designated for shorting (i.e., the 
short legs) are typically the stocks that are harder 
and more expensive to short. For example, Drechsler 
and Drechsler (2016) found that shorting fees are 
more than three times higher than normal for the 
short leg of value, momentum, volatility-related, and 
profitability portfolios. They argued that anomalies 
disappear, in fact, for stocks with low lending fees. 
Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2015) showed that the 
short returns of several accounting-based anomalies 
are attributable to hard-to-borrow stocks. Short 
selling also entails additional risks, such as (1) the 
potential for unlimited losses, (2) “short squeeze” 
scenarios (in which investors are unable to close 
their short positions), (3) counterparty risk, and 
(4) reputational risk (because the media can take 
a critical stance toward short sellers; see, for 
example, Angel and McCabe 2009). Finally, legal 
impediments to short selling may exist. For instance, 
many countries have either a partial or a full ban on 
short selling.
In light of these theoretical and practical consider-
ations, we argue that examining the long and short 
dimensions of factor premiums separately is impor-
tant for a proper understanding of factor premiums 
and how to build efficient factor portfolios. The 
issues involved with shorting individual stocks can 
be solved effectively by hedging the market beta of 
a long-only factor portfolio with liquid derivatives 
on broad market indexes. With this approach, one 
captures the performance of the long legs of factor 
premiums. The performance of the short legs can be 
isolated in a similar fashion—that is, by considering 
the short portfolio in combination with an offsetting 
long position in broad market indexes that brings the 
market beta to zero. How both legs contribute to 
factor premiums depends on the relative contribu-
tion of each leg to total performance and also on the 
correlation between the two legs.
Figure 1. How Long 










Notes: In this illustration, the long leg is invested 50/50 in the large-cap and small-cap portfolios 
and hedges out the average of the large-cap growth and small-cap growth portfolios. The short 
leg mirrors the long leg.
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Breaking down commonly studied equity factor 
premiums over the 1963–2018 period, we found that 
the long-minus-market approach has offered more 
value than the full-fledged long–short approach for 
individual factors and even more so for a multifactor 
combination. This key result is summarized in the 
first three bars in Figure 2. Factors can be harvested 
in both long legs and short legs with positive premi-
ums. As Figure 2 shows, however, Sharpe ratios have 
been highest for the long legs of factors and lowest 
for the short legs. We found that a key driver of 
the higher risk-adjusted returns for long legs is that 
individual factors have close to zero correlation on 
their long sides while being positively correlated on 
their short sides. Consequently, long legs offer better 
diversification across factors. Further tests revealed 
that short legs typically have zero or negative alpha 
after controlling for the long legs. In contrast, long 
legs generally have a significantly positive alpha that 
cannot be explained by the short legs. Spanning and 
optimization tests show that short legs typically 
do not improve portfolios containing long legs. In 
other words, the dominant part of factor premiums 
is generally on the long side and the short legs of 
factor premiums are subsumed by their long-leg 
counterparts.
We also examined the role of size because limits 
to arbitrage are generally higher in small caps and 
many studies have shown that factor premiums 
tend to be larger in the small-cap space than in the 
large-cap (or “big” in Fama–French terms) space.2 
We confirmed these authors’ results, as summarized 
in Figure 2. Furthermore, we found that the long side 
of factor strategies exhibits stronger performance 
and subsumes the short legs both in the large-cap 
space and in the small-cap space. Moreover, start-
ing from the long side of factors in the large-cap 
space, a bigger gain can be obtained by adding the 
long side in the small-cap space than by adding the 
short side in the large-cap space. Similarly, portfolio 
tests revealed that short legs are of limited value to 
most investors whereas long legs in small caps add 
significant value.
We found our results to be robust and consistent 
over time as to size considerations and in relation to 
a range of methodological choices. We also found 
similar results internationally—for various regions 
around the world and for global versions of the 
factor strategies. Moreover, the results cannot be 
explained by tail risk.
Our breakdown of factor strategies into their long 
and short legs also yielded new insights into the 
low-risk and value premiums. The low-risk premium, 
which was documented in Blitz and van Vliet (2007); 
Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011); and Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014), derives from the finding that low-
risk stocks earn high risk-adjusted returns whereas 
high-risk stocks earn low risk-adjusted returns. The 
result is a significant alpha for low-risk stocks that is 
not explained by such classic factors as market, size, 
value, and momentum. Novy-Marx (2014) argued, 
Figure 2. The Long 




















Note: Shown are the Sharpe ratios for the equal-weighted combinations of HML, WML, 
RMW, CMA, and VOL (low volatility vs. high volatility) factor portfolios, split per long leg 
(“Long”), long–short (“L–S”), and short leg (“Short”) and for all stocks, large-cap stocks, and 
small-cap stocks.
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however, that the low-risk premium is explained by 
the profitability factor introduced in Novy-Marx 
(2013). Similarly, Fama and French (2016) found that 
the low-risk premium is subsumed by their recently 
introduced profitability and investment factors. 
Early findings for the value factor premium have also 
come under attack. Fama and French (2015) showed 
that their classic value factor based on book-to-
market ratios (HML) is rendered redundant by the 
new investment and profitability factors. Neither 
the Novy-Marx (2013, 2014) studies nor the Fama–
French (2015) study made a distinction, however, 
between the long legs and the short legs of the 
low-risk and value factors.
Breaking down factor portfolios into their long 
and short legs, we found that the conclusions of 
Novy-Marx (2014) and Fama and French (2015, 
2016) regarding the low-risk and value factors are 
entirely driven by the short sides of these strate-
gies. The short sides of low risk and value are indeed 
subsumed by the other factors—in particular, (low) 
profitability and (high) investment. In other words, 
the poor performance of high-risk and growth stocks 
can be explained by their resemblance to “junk.” The 
performance of the long sides of low-risk and value 
strategies cannot be explained, however, by the 
long sides of other factors, including (high) profit-
ability and (low) investment. This asymmetrical result 
implies that low risk and value are distinct factors 
on the long side and that the long–short results for 
these factors are dominated by their different behav-
ior on the short side.
For factor-based investors, our results indicate that 
because the short legs of Fama–French-style port-
folios provide no unique alpha, an efficient approach 
to factor investing is simply to concentrate on the 
long legs and hedge out the market beta with liquid 
market index derivatives. However, we need to 
mention a couple of caveats here. First, investing 
in just the long legs gives only about half the raw 
return, so double the amount of gross leverage is 
needed to attain the original return level. Second, the 
impact of costs should be accounted for. Considering 
all relevant costs, however, we believe that our 
conclusions are unlikely to change fundamentally. 
Most important in this regard are the magnitude of 
shorting costs and the feasibility of shorting. Finally, 
we caution against overgeneralizing our conclusions. 
Our analysis was limited to the recognized academic 
factors and extended to the q-factors of Hou, Xue, 
and Zhang (2015); it does not necessarily carry over 
to the many other factors that have been proposed in 
the asset pricing literature or to portfolios optimized 
on individual stocks after accounting for various 
factor- and risk-based constraints.
Data and Methodology
Most of our data came from the online data library 
of Professor Kenneth French.3 From that source, 
we obtained monthly returns for the 2×3 portfolios 
behind the value (HML), momentum (WML), profit-
ability (RMW), and investment (CMA) factors for 
the US market for the period July 1963 through 
December 2018. We did not include the size factor in 
our analyses because it was already constructed in a 
long-minus-market fashion. 
We augmented the Fama–French factors with a low 
volatility versus high volatility (VOL) factor, based on 
the work of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006); 
Blitz and van Vliet (2007); and many subsequent 
studies. For an overview, see Blitz, van Vliet, and 
Baltussen (2019). Inclusion of the VOL factor was 
inspired by the betting-against-beta (BAB) factor of 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), but our construction of 
it was closer to the Fama–French construction meth-
odology to prevent the issues identified by Novy-
Marx and Velikov (2018), who found that a large part 
of the BAB premium stems from dynamic hedging 
and shorting highly illiquid microcaps. Our choice to 
use volatility rather than beta had no material impact 
on our conclusions, as we discuss later.
The VOL factor is based on 2×3 portfolio sorts, like 
the other long–short Fama–French equity factors. 
Every month, we classified all stocks in the CRSP 
database as either large or small on the basis of the 
NYSE median market capitalization as the break-
point. Next, we sorted stocks within the size groups 
on their past 36-month volatility, and we assigned 
them to low-, mid-, or high-risk portfolios on the 
basis of the NYSE 30th and 70th percentiles as 
breakpoints. We value-weighted all the portfolios, 
and each portfolio was levered up or down to a 
market beta of 1.0 to make the VOL factor market 
neutral. 
For simplicity, we estimated full-sample market 
betas against the Fama–French market portfolio. 
(But note that the results did not change when we 
used a rolling-window estimate.) The 30-day T-bill 
rate is the borrowing and savings rate. This beta 
adjustment is our only departure from the standard 
Fama–French construction methodology. The VOL 
factor was created by taking a 50/50 long position in 
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large-cap low-volatility and small-cap low-volatility 
stocks, combined with a 50/50 short position in 
large-cap high-volatility and small-cap high-volatility 
stocks. Data for this VOL factor are from Robeco 
(http://www.robeco.com/data). 
Based on the underlying 2×3 portfolios, we were 
able to break down all long–short factors in two 
ways. One breakdown is into the large-cap and 
small-cap components. For the value factor, for 
example, the full-fledged long–short value strategy is 
the Fama–French HML portfolio, which is long 50% 
large-cap value (high book to price) and 50% small-
cap value and short 50% large-cap growth and 50% 
small-cap growth (low book to price). The large-cap 
component is long the large-cap value portfolio and 
short the large-cap growth portfolio, and the small-
cap component is long the small-cap value portfolio 
and short the small-cap growth portfolio. Note that a 
50/50 combination of these large-cap and small-cap 
components yields the original HML factor.
Another breakdown of the standard long–short 
factors is into their long and short legs, where, again, 
we strove for consistency with the Fama–French 
methodology. For value as an example again, we 
constructed the long leg by going long the “high” 
component of the HML portfolio (i.e., 50% large-cap 
value and 50% small-cap value) and short a neutral 
hedging portfolio. For the short leg, we were short 
the “low” component of the HML portfolio (i.e., 50% 
large-cap growth and 50% small-cap growth) and 
long the same neutral hedging portfolio. Note that 
with the long and short legs defined in this way, tak-
ing the sum of the two legs yields the original HML 
factor. We used the same approach for the other fac-
tors. This approach is visually illustrated in Figure 1, 
where the top arrows represent the long leg and the 
bottom arrows, the short leg.
A natural candidate for the neutral hedging port-
folio would be the cap-weighted market portfolio. 
With that choice, however, all the results would be 
distorted by the size effect because the long leg is 
50% long in small-cap stocks and the short leg is 
50% short in small-cap stocks. To prevent such size 
distortions, using the two components of the Fama 
and French (2015) SMB (small minus big) factor, we 
defined the neutral hedging portfolio as 50% large-
cap stocks (Big) plus 50% small-cap stocks (Small). 
The Fama–French large-cap and small-cap portfolios 
are derived from the 2×3 size/value, 2×3 size/profit-
ability, and 2×3 size/investment sorted portfolios, 
with the large-cap portfolio being the simple aver-
age of the nine large-cap stock portfolios and the 
small-cap portfolio being the simple average of the 
nine small-cap stock portfolios. With this choice for 
the neutral hedging portfolio, we ensured that all 
long and short legs would have a net zero exposure 
to large-cap and small-cap stocks. Although this 
process did not ensure exact size neutrality (because 
a factor strategy might prefer the larger or smaller 
stocks within the large-cap and small-cap universes), 
it produced a much better approximation than using 
the cap-weighted market portfolio. In a robustness 
analysis, we show that our conclusions remained 
unchanged when we made other choices for the neu-
tral hedging portfolio. Note that, in practice, highly 
liquid and cost-efficient derivatives, such as S&P 500 
and Russell 2000 index futures, can be used to hedge 
factor portfolios in a size-neutral fashion.
Throughout most of our analysis, we used Sharpe 
ratios—that is, volatility-adjusted returns—as the key 
evaluation metric. In unreported tests, we found 
similar results when we used alphas—that is, mar-
ket-beta-adjusted returns—instead of Sharpe ratios. 
The intuition behind this similarity is that the ex post 
betas of our test portfolios are close to zero, which 
means that CAPM (capital asset pricing model) alphas 
are similar to raw returns. Thus, our Sharpe ratios 
can also be interpreted as Treynor and Black’s (1973) 
appraisal ratios—that is, volatility-adjusted alphas—
and when the (annualized) Sharpe ratios are multi-
plied by a constant (the square root of the number 
of years in our sample), they are approximately equal 
to the t-values of the alphas. For our 1963–2018 
sample, therefore, a Sharpe ratio greater than 0.26 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The Long and Short Sides 
of Factor Premiums
Panel A of Table 1 shows the performance of the 
long legs of the five factors based on the standard 
Fama–French methodology. The individual Sharpe 
ratios range from 0.31 to 0.61, but for an equally 
weighted portfolio of the five long legs, the Sharpe 
ratio increases to 1.10 because of diversification. 
In Panel B of Table 1, the short legs of the five fac-
tors are shown. As was the case for the long legs, 
factor premiums are positive for the short legs. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the factor returns 
is similar for the long and the short legs. That said, 
note that the short legs have a higher volatility 
than the long legs, causing three of the five factors 
(value, momentum, and investment) to have a lower 
Sharpe ratio on the short side than on the long side. 
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The short leg of the momentum factor exhibits 
particularly high volatility, consistent with the finding 
of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) that momentum crashes stem 
from the short legs. For the two other factors (profit-
ability and low risk), the short side appears to be a 
little stronger. When all five factors are combined (as 
in the last column), the long side—with a Sharpe ratio 
of 1.10 versus only 0.69 for the short side—clearly 
emerges as the winner. This result indicates that the 
long legs diversify much better than the short legs. 
Panel C of Table 1 shows the combination of the 
long and short legs—that is, the standard long–short 
factors. The results are in between those in Panels 
A and B, with Sharpe ratios for the individual fac-
tors varying between 0.40 and 0.58 and a combined 
Sharpe ratio of 0.86.
Table A1 in Appendix A shows that these conclu-
sions carry over to the q-factors (profitability and low 
investment) introduced by Hou et al. (2015); that is, 
the long legs of these factors also offer higher Sharpe 
ratios and better diversification than the short legs. 
In other words, factor premiums are in general more 
attractive on the long side.
Table 2, by reporting for each factor its average 
correlation with the other factors, provides insight 
into factor diversification on the long side versus 
on the short side. For example, value stocks (the 
long leg of HML) are shown to have an average 
correlation of 0.04 with the other long factor legs. 
In contrast, growth stocks (the short leg of HML) 
have an average correlation of 0.38 with the other 
short legs. In other words, growth stocks comove 
with risky/unprofitable/loser stocks whereas value 
Table 1. Breakdown of Factor Premiums, July 1963–December 2018
HML WML RMW CMA VOL All
A. Long leg of factors
Return (%) 2.1 3.6 1.0 1.6 3.7 2.4 
Volatility (%) 5.3 5.9 3.3 3.2 6.9 2.2 
Sharpe ratio 0.40 0.61 0.31 0.49 0.53 1.10
B. Short leg of factors
Return (%) 1.8 4.4 2.1 1.8 2.7 2.5 
Volatility (%) 4.8 9.5 4.8 4.6 4.9 3.7 
Sharpe ratio 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.54 0.69
C. Long–short factors
Return (%) 3.9 8.0 3.1 3.4 6.3 4.9 
Volatility (%) 9.7 14.5 7.5 6.9 11.0 5.7 
Sharpe ratio 0.40 0.55 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.86
Notes: All factors are market neutral. In Panels A and B, each leg is an equal 50/50 combination of the large-cap and small-cap 
portions, minus the market (50/50 Big/Small portfolios), to neutralize market and size tilts. Panel C is the sum of Panels A and B 
and the classical way of presenting long–short factors.
Table 2. Diversification Benefits of Factors: Correlations, July 1963–December 2018
HML WML RMW CMA VOL All
Long leg 0.04 –0.16 –0.09 –0.05 0.08 –0.04
Short leg 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.31
Long–short 0.26 –0.03 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.19
Note: Shown is the average pairwise correlation of each factor with the other factors for each leg and the long–short portfolio.
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stocks are virtually uncorrelated with stable/profit-
able/winner stocks. The average correlation among 
all long legs is negative, –0.04; the corresponding 
number for the short legs is positive, 0.31. Thus, the 
diversification benefits of factors are asymmetrical. 
They are more powerful on the long side than on 
the short side.
Although the 0.35 difference in correlation between 
long legs and short legs might not seem that large, 
it compounds to sizable risk-adjusted return differ-
ences when multiple factors are combined. Figure 3 
shows that the average Sharpe ratio for single factors 
is about 0.5, both on the long side and on the short 
side. When three factors are combined, however, 
the Sharpe ratio goes up to 0.8, on average, for the 
long legs versus only 0.6 for the short legs. This gap 
widens when all five factors are combined; the long 
portfolio reaches a Sharpe ratio of 1.1, but the ratio 
is less than 0.7 for the short portfolio.
The results so far indicate that because of lower 
correlations between the long legs of factors, fac-
tors are better rewarded on the long side than on the 
short side. Investors might still leave some perfor-
mance on the table, however, by ignoring the short 
legs altogether. To address this concern, we directly 
examined the added value of factors on the long and 
short sides. We started by examining the correlations 
between the long and short legs, as shown in the 
top row of Table 3. Correlations are generally high, 
ranging between 0.59 and 0.85 for individual factors. 
The correlation increases to 0.87 for the multifactor 
combination, which also explains why, in Table 1, the 
volatilities of the long-leg portfolio (2.2%) and the 
short-leg portfolio (3.7%) almost fully add up to the 
volatility of the long–short portfolio (5.7%). These 
numbers show that the long legs and short legs offer 
closely related exposures, especially when factors 
are combined.
The question is, then, what do the long legs and 
short legs each contribute when the “other” leg has 
been controlled for? To find an answer, we separately 
regressed each individual factor leg on all flip-side 
legs. These tests examine the added value of long-
leg and short-leg portfolios and have t-values that 
reflect the Treynor–Black (1973) appraisal ratio (see 
De Roon, Nijman, and Werker 2001). Specifically, 
in previous tests of Sharpe ratios, we compared the 
performance of different portfolios, whereas the 
regressions reported in Table 3 indicate the potential 
improvement in performance when one particular 
leg is included in the portfolio. The results, shown in 
Panel B, reveal that the alpha of the long leg of each 
factor is positive and mostly significant at the 5% 
level. In contrast, the alpha of each short leg ranges 
from nearly zero to significantly negative. In other 
words, none of the short-leg factor exposures adds 
significant value over the long legs.
Next, using a spanning test of all the intercepts 
jointly being nonnegative, following Gibbons, Ross, 
and Shanken (1989) and Kan and Zhou (2012), we 
tested whether the short legs (long legs) are jointly 
spanned by the other legs. The last column of Table 3 
reveals that spanning cannot be rejected for the 
short legs. In other words, short-leg positions in the 
recognized factors do not improve the opportunity 
set of investors.
Figure 3. Diversifica-
tion Benefits of Long 
Legs and Short Legs 









1 Factor 2 Factors 4 Factors3 Factors 5 Factors
Long L–S Short
Note: Shown are the Sharpe ratios of the average portfolio over all possible single-factor and 
multiple-factor portfolios for 1-2-3-4-5 factor combinations.
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We examined the robustness of this conclusion by 
constructing the maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio 
based on the 2×5 factor legs. The weights were 
required to be nonnegative and to sum to 100%. 
Panel C of Table 3 shows that the optimal portfolio, 
the one with the highest return per unit of risk, 
contains positions in each of the five long legs, 
with weights varying between 11.0% and 31.0%. In 
contrast, only 2.6% would be allocated to a single 
short leg (high volatility). When we included (in 
unreported tests) the equity market and/or bond 
market, the allocation to short legs dropped to zero. 
This finding provides confirmation that virtually 
none of the short sides of factors is able to offer 
any value on top of the performance that can 
be obtained by investing in just the long sides of 
factors. That said, keep in mind that these optimiza-
tions assume an investor can leverage to scale the 
maximum-Sharpe-ratio (or long-leg) portfolio to the 
desired risk level. For an investor facing leverage 
constraints, short legs could add more value than 
shown here because they offer higher volatility and 
higher return.
Finally, we regressed the long leg of the multifactor 
portfolio on its short leg and vice versa. In line with 
the preceding analyses, we found that the alpha 
of the long-leg portfolio—that is, the performance 
that remained after we adjusted for the exposures 
to the short-leg portfolio—was positive (1.09%) and 
statistically significant (t-statistic of 7.44). In contrast, 
the short-leg portfolio had a statistically signifi-
cant negative alpha (–1.00%, t-statistic of –3.89). 
The explanation for this result is that the short legs 
had weaker performance than the long legs, and on 
top of that, they barely provided any diversification 
to the long legs.
All these tests show that the long-leg portfolio is 
superior to the short-leg portfolio and that nothing 
essential is lost by ignoring the short side of factors 
altogether. In a nutshell, the short legs are fully sub-
sumed by the long legs and provide no added value 
whatsoever.
Factor Premiums in Large Caps 
and Small Caps
Many studies show that factor premiums tend 
to be larger in small-cap stocks than in large-cap 
stocks.4 A possible mechanism for the difference 
is limits to arbitrage, which are generally higher in 
small caps. Factor premiums are thought to increase 
Table 3.  Added Value of Long Legs and Short Legs, July 1963–December 2018 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
HML WML RMW CMA VOL All
A. Correlations between long and short leg 0.85 0.75 0.70 0.59 0.74 0.87
B. Alphas       
Long leg over short leg 0.70% 2.70% 0.51% 1.19% 0.39% 1.09%
(1.82) (6.44) (2.21) (3.83) (0.76) (7.44)
Short leg over long leg –0.57% –3.07% –0.70% –0.94% 0.15% –1.00%
(–1.86) (–4.04) (–2.07) (–2.91) (0.33) (–3.89)
C. Maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio
HML WML RMW CMA VOL
Spanning 
Test p-Value
Weight of long leg 11.0% 23.7% 20.6% 31.0% 11.0% 0.00
Weight of short leg 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.87
Notes: For the individual factors shown in Panel B, we regressed the long- or short-leg returns on the returns on the other factors 
of the opposite leg. For the combined factor portfolio, we regressed the returns of one leg on those of the other leg. Panel C 
shows the optimal weights in each of the 2×5 legs in the maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio, as well as the p-value of the spanning 
test of the long or short legs of the individual factors jointly being nonnegative.
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with limits to arbitrage. Consequently, size is an 
important dimension in factor premiums. This issue 
is addressed in the standard academic factors, such 
as HML, by averaging over a large-cap leg and a 
small-cap leg to mitigate potential size effects. Thus, 
the standard factors can be broken down not only 
into long and short legs but also into large-cap and 
small-cap components. In this section, we exam-
ine these large-cap and small-cap parts of factors 
separately.
Table 4 contains the results. Consistent with the 
literature, we found that factor performance is 
generally stronger among small caps than among 
large caps. Panel A shows a higher Sharpe ratio in 
the small-cap space than in the large-cap space. The 
equally weighted portfolio of the five factors has a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.08 in the small-cap space versus 
just 0.53 in the large-cap space. The long legs of the 
five factors have a higher combined Sharpe ratio 
than the short legs for both large caps and small 
caps. For large caps, the Sharpe ratio is 0.72 versus 
0.36; for small caps, it is 1.13 versus 0.94. In both size 
segments, the correlations between the long legs are 
lower than the correlations between the short legs. 
The Panel B regression of the long legs on the short 
legs again shows a significantly positive alpha for 
the long legs. In contrast, neither short leg displays 
a significant positive alpha. As previously, spanning 
tests of the large-cap and small-cap multifactor 
portfolios reveal that spanning cannot be rejected for 
the short legs.
To examine whether the small-cap short legs perhaps 
still contain some unique alpha, we again optimized 
for the maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio. Panel C of 
Table 4 shows that most weight is allocated to the 
long legs—17.8% for large caps and 64.9% for small 
Table 4.  Small Caps vs. Large Caps, July 1963–December 2018 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Long Leg Short Leg Long–Short  
A. Sharpe ratios
Large caps 0.72 0.36 0.53  
Small caps 1.13 0.94 1.08  
All caps 1.10 0.69 0.86  
B. Alphas and spanning
 Long Leg Short Leg
Large Caps Small Caps Large Caps Small Caps
Alpha over other legs 0.67% 1.24% –1.95% –0.04%
(3.11) (5.18) (–5.68) (–0.15)
Spanning (p-value) 0.00 0.84
C. Maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio
 Long Leg Short Leg
Large Caps Small Caps Large Caps Small Caps
Large caps (5×2 portfolios) 97.5% — 2.5% —
Small caps (5×2 portfolios) — 74.8% — 25.2%
All caps (5×2×2 portfolios) 17.8% 64.9% 0.0% 17.4%
Notes: In Panel B, the p-value is for the spanning test of either the long or short legs jointly being non-
negative. Panel C shows the optimal weights in the maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolio when each factor is 
considered individually.
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caps. The remaining weight, 17.4%, is concentrated 
in the small-cap short legs of investment and volatil-
ity. For small caps only, the optimal allocation to the 
short legs becomes 25.2%. Thus, short legs are able 
to add some value after all, but only in the small-cap 
space. That space is also, however, where limits to 
arbitrage are most prevalent. Shorting small-cap 
stocks can be particularly expensive and is difficult, 
if not impossible, to implement on a large scale, as 
we discuss in the section “The Role of Costs and 
Investment Frictions.” When we optimized only over 
large caps, the allocation to the short legs dwindled 
to a mere 2.5%, in line with our base-case results in 
the previous section.
Robustness Tests
In this section, we analyze how the results reported 
so far varied when we considered different time 
frames, whether the results proved to be robust 
to the choice of the neutral hedging portfolio, and 
whether the results were robust to using more 
granular (5×5) sorts for the portfolios. We also exam-
ine asymmetrical risk measures and consider whether 
our results carry over to international markets.
Subsample Results. We conducted a decade-
by-decade analysis. Panel A of Figure A1 shows the 
Sharpe ratios of the combined five long legs and the 
combined five short legs for six subperiods. In each 
of the subperiods, the long legs have higher Sharpe 
ratios than the short legs, indicating that our main 
result is highly robust over time. The magnitude of 
the difference varies—being smaller in the 1970s and 
2000s and bigger in the 1960s and 2010s—but with-
out any clear trend over time. Panel B of Figure A1 
shows the t-values of the alphas of the long (short) 
portfolio regressed on the short (long) portfolio. 
Confirming our full-sample results, the added value 
of the long legs is consistently positive and significant 
while the short legs consistently do not add alpha 
over the long legs.
To further examine the dynamics between the long 
and short legs, we plotted the 10-year rolling correla-
tion of each long and short leg. The resulting plot is 
shown in Figure A2. 
Correlations between the legs, which were high 
throughout our sample period, vary between 68% 
and 93% in Figure A2. We also examined the alpha 
of the long legs over the short legs, and vice versa, 
for the same 10-year rolling subperiods. Figure A3 
reports the resulting t-values of the alphas for 
the multifactor portfolios. The alpha of long legs 
over short legs is consistent over time; the short 
legs fail to display significant added value in every 
10-year subperiod. In other words, these dynam-
ics suggest no specific episodes in which short 
legs dominated.
Choice of Hedging Portfolio. We also 
examined the robustness of our results to the choice 
of hedging portfolio. Our base-case definition of the 
hedging portfolio was 50% large-cap stocks (Big) 
plus 50% small-cap stocks (Small), where the Big 
and Small portfolios are the same as in the Fama and 
French (2015) SMB size factor. Our first alternative 
was to define the hedging portfolio as a 50/50 mix 
of the two “neutral” portfolios in the standard 2×3 
sorts. Taking the value factor as an example, the 
process was to hedge the long leg, which consisted 
of 50% large-cap value (top 30% based on book-to-
market data) and 50% small-cap value, with 50% 
large-cap neutral (the middle 40% of stocks based 
on book-to-market data) and 50% small-cap neutral. 
For the short leg, which consisted of 50/50 short 
positions in large-cap growth and small-cap growth 
(bottom 30% based on book-to-market data), we took 
an offsetting 50/50 long position in the same two 
neutral portfolios. 
Panels A and B of Table A2 report the Sharpe ratios 
for our base-case approach and the alternative hedg-
ing approach just described. The alternative hedge 
leads to lower Sharpe ratios for both the long legs 
and the short legs, but the multifactor short portfolio 
is hit harder than the multifactor long portfolio. As 
a result, our conclusion that the long side of fac-
tor premiums dominates the short side remains 
unchanged—actually, is strengthened.
In another robustness test, we departed from the 
standard 2×3 Fama–French construction methodol-
ogy, which gives a disproportionately high weight to 
small-cap stocks. Following Cremers, Petajisto, and 
Zitzewitz (2013), we considered factor portfolios that 
were fully market-cap weighted. Taking the value 
factor as an example again, the process resulted in 
the long leg consisting of a cap-weighted long posi-
tion in the top 30% of stocks measured by book-to-
market ratio across the full universe. The short leg 
took a cap-weighted short position in the bottom 
30% of stocks by book-to-market ratio across the 
full universe. For the hedging portfolio, we consid-
ered two alternatives—namely, (1) the cap-weighted 
market portfolio and (2) the neutral portfolio for 
the factor under consideration (i.e., for the value 
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factor, the cap-weighted middle 40% of stocks by 
book-to-market ratio across the full universe). The 
results of these tests are reported in Panels C and 
D of Table A2. The cap-weighted factor portfolios 
produced lower Sharpe ratios across the board, as 
expected on the basis of our earlier finding that 
factors are stronger in the small-cap space. The 
short legs of the value and investment factors were 
hit particularly hard by the alternative methodolo-
gies; they barely remain positive. When we compare 
the performance of the multifactor long and short 
portfolios, our conclusions remain unchanged. If 
anything, the performance gap seems to widen a 
little; the multifactor long portfolios exhibit Sharpe 
ratios that are approximately double those of the 
multifactor short portfolios.
In summary, the test results in Table A2 show that 
our conclusions are robust to methodological choices 
regarding the neutral hedging portfolio and factor 
portfolio weighting.
Results for 5×5 Portfolios. The standard 2×3 
Fama–French construction methodology splits the 
investment universe into two parts on the basis of 
equity market capitalization (size). This methodology 
mitigates a potential size bias in factor portfolios, 
but second-order size effects may still arise within 
these two segments. For instance, the value factor 
tends to go long the smaller stocks within each of the 
two segments, whereas the profitability and low-risk 
factors tend to go long the larger stocks. For the 
momentum factor, the preference for large or small 
stocks is highly time varying. Regressing the multi-
factor long- and short-leg returns on the SMB factor 
(results not tabulated), we observed ex post factor 
loadings on SMB amounting to –0.04 for the long 
legs and –0.09 for the short legs.
To further control for the effect of size, and also 
to examine the robustness of our results to more 
methodological choices, we repeated our main tests 
on more granular, 5×5 portfolios sorted on the size 
factor. For the value, profitability, investment, and 
momentum factors, the data are from French’s data 
library, and we followed the same methodology to 
construct the low-risk factor. So, every month, we 
independently double-sorted all stocks on size and 
past 36-month volatility; we used NYSE breakpoints 
for the five size quintiles and the five volatility 
quintiles. For each factor, we created long and short 
legs within each of the five size buckets. A long leg is 
the top quintile in a size bucket minus the average of 
the five quintiles in that size bucket, and the short leg 
is the average of the five quintiles in the size bucket 
minus the bottom quintile.
The Sharpe ratios for the 5×5 approach are summa-
rized in Table A3. In line with our previous findings, 
we observe that the general effectiveness of fac-
tors increases as the size segment becomes smaller. 
Performance is strongest among microcap stocks. 
This result is consistent with the existing literature 
and also with the results shown in Table 4. In each 
of the five size segments, the combined Sharpe ratio 
for the long legs is higher than that for the short 
legs; the long–short Sharpe ratios are in between. 
Although microcaps provided the highest risk-
adjusted returns, the lack of diversification among 
the short legs of the factors in the microcap segment 
is striking. The individual microcap short legs have 
high individual Sharpe ratios, but the combined short 
portfolio has only a slightly better performance, 
which indicates considerable overlap in the microcap 
short-leg portfolios. In contrast, the long legs have 
lower individual Sharpe ratios, but the combined long 
portfolio has by far the highest Sharpe ratio. Overall, 
our results for the 5×5 portfolios are in line with our 
base-case results for the 2×3 portfolios: The long 
legs are superior to the short legs, and adding the 
short legs to the long legs merely detracts from risk-
adjusted performance.
We further examined the attractiveness of the long 
legs versus the short legs by using mean–variance 
optimization. In Panel A of Table A4, we show results 
for maximum-Sharpe-ratio portfolios within each 
of the five size buckets separately. We observe that 
among the largest (megacap) stocks, the optimal 
portfolio consists almost exclusively (97.6%) of long 
legs. As we descend into smaller-cap buckets, the 
short legs become more attractive. In the microcap 
space, the optimal portfolio has 46.1% of its weight 
in short legs. Panel B of Table A4 shows the results 
for portfolios optimized on the long and short 
legs of the top two size buckets, the top three size 
buckets, and so forth. Here, we also see that most 
of the weight is allocated to long legs but short legs 
increasingly make it into the optimal portfolio as 
smaller-cap buckets are added. When all long and 
short legs from all size buckets are included, 32.4% 
of the weight goes to short legs, mostly (28.2%) in 
the microcap space.
The main takeaway from Table A4 is that the long 
legs generally dominate the short legs but that 
among the smallest stocks in the universe, the short 
legs offer some unique added value. These short 
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positions are concentrated in microcap stocks with 
poor profitability, high investment, and high risk. 
This result is consistent with the finding of Fama and 
French (2015) that, although their five-factor model 
generally does a good job, it fails to explain the 
exceptionally low return of microcap junk stocks—
that is, very small risky stocks with low profitability 
and aggressive investment. Unfortunately, these 
stocks are precisely the kind of short positions that 
are most difficult and most expensive to take on in 
reality. We discuss costs and feasibility further in the 
section on practical implications, “The Role of Costs 
and Investment Frictions.”
Asymmetrical Risk Measures. A potential 
explanation of the results so far might be that 
risks are asymmetrical. (For this argument, see, for 
example, Bawa and Lindenberg 1977 or, for a more 
recent example, Ang, Chen, and Xing 2006.) In other 
words, the long legs may be less attractive than 
the short legs from a tail-risk perspective. In light 
of these concerns, we examined tail risk, measured 
in terms of cumulative drawdowns, of the long and 
short legs over time. Figure A4 shows that the long 
legs exhibited a consistently lower drawdown risk 
than the short legs. The short legs were often twice 
as risky as the long legs and experienced significantly 
deeper drawdowns.
An explanation for Figure A4 may be that factor 
performance was generally weak during the dot-com 
bubble of the late 1990s, but the losses on the short 
legs (risky, unprofitable, growth stocks) exceeded 
the losses on the long legs (stable, profitable, value 
stocks). Also, in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2007–2009, most factors underperformed; 
the momentum factor performed particularly poorly. 
Again, however, the losses of the short legs were up 
to three times larger than the losses of the long legs 
in 2009. In other words, when factors fail, the short 
legs tend to be hit harder. These results are con-
sistent with those of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), 
who found that the momentum factor is vulnerable 
to crash risk and that this risk mainly arises from the 
short side of the factor.
Table A5 reports various nonsymmetrical risk 
statistics for the multifactor combination of the long 
and short legs, thereby providing additional confir-
mation of this result. The short legs exhibit a more 
negative skewness and a higher excess kurtosis than 
the long legs. They also have a higher semi-deviation 
(2.4% vs. 1.3%) and a much higher 95% VAR (value 
at risk). Some of this downside risk is idiosyncratic, 
but the systematic contribution to downside risk is 
also higher for short legs, as shown by the higher 
downside betas. Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) showed 
that a lower-partial-moment (LPM) (0) beta  provides 
a better description of the risk and return of stocks 
than does standard deviation. Lettau, Maggiori, and 
Weber (2014) used LPM (1 sigma) beta to under-
stand the risk/return relationship in currency and 
other markets. Although Levi and Welch (2020) 
showed that downside risk measures are not always 
better than standard deviation in predicting down-
side risk, downside risk measures are still useful 
for evaluating the risk of a particular strategy. The 
downside betas of the short legs are, at best, slightly 
lower than those of the long legs, but the differences 
are tiny.
In summary, a downside risk perspective seems 
unlikely to explain the finding that the long side of 
factors dominates the short side.
International Evidence. Several papers have 
documented the existence of factor premiums in 
international samples.5 To examine the robustness 
of our findings, we considered the international 
evidence. We followed the same testing approach 
as previously but applied it to the international 2×3 
portfolios from French’s data library, and we used 
the volatility factor from Hanauer and Windmueller 
(2019). We considered four regions (North America, 
Europe, Japan, Asia ex Japan), similarly to Fama 
and French (2012), and a global portfolio. We 
studied the maximum available sample period, July 
1990–December 2018. Table 5 shows the results. 
Consistent with our findings for the United States, 
we found that for North America, Europe, Asia ex 
Japan, and the global portfolio, the long legs tend to 
have higher Sharpe ratios than the short legs. Only 
for Japan do the short legs appear to be slightly 
stronger than the long legs. In the global sample, 
for example, the long legs have a Sharpe ratio of 
1.19 versus 0.66 for the short legs. For this sample, 
the correlation between the long and short legs is 
0.80, indicating very similar exposures and warn-
ing that limited diversification is possible between 
long legs and short legs. Furthermore, the long legs 
consistently have positive alphas (i.e., add value 
over the short legs) in all the portfolios, whereas the 
reverse does not hold true. For example, the alpha 
of the global long legs is significantly positive (1.56%, 
t-statistic of 5.75) and cannot be explained by the 
short legs; the short alpha of the global portfolio is 
significantly negative (–0.89%, t-statistic of –2.37), 
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which is, again, in line with the results for the 
US market.
The global results are also consistent over time. 
Panel A of Figure A5 shows that in each of three 
subperiods (i.e., decades) in our sample, the long 
legs have higher Sharpe ratios than the short legs. 
Similarly, Panel B of Figure A5 shows that the long 
legs add consistent alpha over the short legs during 
each decade in the international sample, while short 
legs consistently do not add alpha over the long legs. 
In summary, the long legs of factors dominate the 
short legs also in international markets.
Asset Pricing Implications
We investigated the asset pricing implications of our 
findings. Recent studies (e.g., Fama and French 2015) 
have argued that the value and low-risk factors are 
subsumed by the new Fama–French factors—profit-
ability and investment. We found, however, that the 
results reported in these studies are entirely driven 
by the short legs of these factors. The long legs of 
the value and low-risk factors offer distinct premi-
ums that cannot be explained by the long legs of 
other factors.
Growth Is Junk, but Value Is Not 
Quality. Fama and French (2015) found that their 
classic value factor (HML) is rendered redundant 
by the profitability and investment factors in their 
five-factor model. We reevaluated this result in light 
of our findings that factor premiums predominantly 
originate on the long side and that correlations of 
HML with the other factors are materially lower on 
the long side (0.04) than on the short side (0.38) or in 
the long–short combination (0.26; see Table 2). In our 
tests, we followed Fama and French (2015) by using a 
time-series regressions approach. Panel A of Table 6 
shows that the value factor had a highly signifi-
cant CAPM alpha over the 1963–2018 period. The 
multifactor regressions reveal that this alpha, 4.91%, 
did, indeed, fall to an insignificant –0.13% when we 
controlled for the loadings of HML on the other four 
factors that nowadays compose the Fama–French 
five-factor model. The biggest hit came from a very 
high loading on the CMA (investment) factor, which 
has a coefficient close to 1.0 and an associated 
t-statistic greater than 20. This finding is robust to 
adding WML (momentum) and VOL as additional 
control factors.
Our breakdown of factors into their long and short 
sides enabled us to provide a fresh perspective 
on the HML factor. Panel B of Table 6 shows that 
the alpha of the long leg of HML remained strong 
(+1.98%) and highly significant when we controlled 
for the long legs of all other Fama–French factors. 
One reason for this result is that the loading on the 
CMA factor became much lower than it had been, 
and another reason is that the loading on RMW went 
from positive to negative. Panel C of Table 6 shows 
the results for the short leg (growth part) of HML. 
For this short leg, the alpha vanished completely 
(–0.22%) after we adjusted for exposure to the short 
sides of other factors. Especially significant was the 
exposure to the short leg of CMA (that is, aggressive 
Table 5.  International Results, July 1990–December 2018 (t-statistics in parentheses)
North America Europe Japan Asia ex Japan Global
A. Annualized Sharpe ratio
Long leg 0.88 1.19 0.33 1.10 1.19
Short leg 0.50 0.92 0.35 0.99 0.66
Long–short 0.69 1.12 0.39 1.14 0.94
B. Alphas
Alpha long leg over short leg 1.44 1.21 0.39 1.28 1.56
(5.14) (3.91) (0.89) (3.02) (5.75)
Alpha short leg over long leg –1.15 0.11 0.53 0.86 –0.89
(–3.34) (0.28) (1.12) (1.76) (–2.37)
Note: All factors are market neutral. 
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Table 6. HML and Long versus Short Legs (t-statistics in parentheses)
 Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB RMW CMA WML VOL
A. HML
CAPM 4.91% –0.16      
(3.87) (–6.88)      
Four factors –0.13% 0.02 0.03 0.14 1.00   
(–0.13) (1.00) (1.08) (3.50) (23.66)   
Six factors 0.66% –0.07 0.11 –0.03 0.76 –0.11 0.28
(0.73) (–3.42) (4.08) (–0.67) (16.64) (–6.63) (8.99)
B. Long leg (value)
Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB Robust Conservative Winner Low Volatility
CAPM 2.49% –0.06      
(3.51) (–4.52)      
Four factors 1.98% –0.05 0.00 –0.23 0.44   
(2.89) (–3.64) (–0.14) (–3.60) (6.39)   
Six factors 1.21% –0.04 0.10 –0.32 0.31 –0.16 0.35
(2.00) (–3.78) (5.65) (–5.49) (5.19) (–5.20) (12.44)
C. Short leg (growth)








CAPM 2.41% –0.10      
(3.98) (–9.08)      
Four factors –0.22% 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.90   
(–0.59) (3.80) (1.54) (2.26) (34.25)   
Six factors 0.11% 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.85 –0.06 0.09
(0.31) (0.31) (1.87) (1.11) (27.51) (–5.39) (2.93)
D. Subperiods
 1963–1990  1991–2018
HML Long Short  HML Long Short
CAPM alpha 6.12% 3.36% 2.76%  3.48% 1.44% 2.04%
(3.82) (3.75) (3.54)  (1.78) (1.36) (2.15)
Four-factor alpha 2.76% 3.24% 0.24%  –2.52% 0.60% –0.84%
(2.31) (4.43) (0.47)  (–1.76) (0.50) (–1.56)
Six-factor alpha 1.80% 1.80% 0.48%  –1.20% 0.12% –0.36%
(1.49) (2.43) (0.88)  (–0.91) (0.11) (–0.73)
Notes: The sample period for Panels A–C is July 1963–December 2018. Mkt – Rf is exposure to the market: the market return 
minus the risk-free rate. Panel A shows the long–short results for HML (value), Panel B shows the long leg (value) results, and 
Panel C shows the short leg (growth) results. Panel D shows the robustness of the tests in the subsample periods: July 1963–
December 1990 and January 1991–December 2018.
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investment), with a t-statistic greater than 30. Again, 
this result is robust to adding the WML and VOL 
factors to the analysis, as shown in the six-factor 
findings in Panel C.
In other words, the poor performance of growth 
stocks can be fully explained by their resemblance 
to junk, but the strong performance of value stocks 
cannot be attributed to quality characteristics. Thus, 
value is not the simple inverse of growth. Altogether, 
we found that the finding of Fama and French (2015) 
is entirely driven by the short leg of HML and that 
their conclusions do not hold for the long leg of 
HML. The long side of value holds its ground as a 
distinct factor that is not subsumed by the long sides 
of other factors.
To examine the robustness of our findings, we 
repeated all tests we had carried out for the full 
sample period in subperiods, July 1963–December 
1990 and January 1991–December 2018. The first 
subperiod is the exact same period that was used in 
the seminal Fama and French (1992) study. Panel D 
of Table 6 shows the corresponding alphas and 
t-statistics. Recall that for the full sample, we found 
that, although the standard value premium was 
explained by the new Fama–French factors, the long 
side of the value premium was not explained by the 
long sides of the other factors. As Panel D shows, 
for the first subperiod, the standard value premium 
remained significant after we controlled for the 
other Fama–French factors. This result is, again, fully 
driven by the long leg; the short leg is subsumed by 
the short legs of the other factors. In the second sub-
period, the raw value premium is not even significant. 
The long side again appears to be stronger than the 
short side, but both were not significantly different 
from zero during this period. These results imply 
that if the value premium manifests itself, the unique 
alpha is coming from the long side but if the value 
premium does not materialize, the investor does not 
have much left to salvage.
High Risk Is Junk, but Low Risk Is Not 
Quality. Novy-Marx (2014) found that the low-
risk anomaly is subsumed by the profitability factor 
of Novy-Marx (2013). In a similar spirit, Fama and 
French (2016) found that the low-risk anomaly is 
explained by the five-factor model that includes the 
profitability and investment factors. We reevaluated 
this result in light of our finding that factor premiums 
tend to be stronger and less correlated on the 
long side.
Similarly to our analysis for value, we separately 
considered the long and short legs of the VOL (low 
volatility) factor and used time-series regressions 
for the evaluation. Panel A of Table 7 shows that 
the highly significant CAPM alpha of the long–short 
volatility factor fell to 0.58% when we controlled 
for exposure to the current Fama–French factors—
because of, in particular, highly significant loadings 
on the RMW (profitability), CMA (investment), and 
HML (value) factors. As we found for HML, a differ-
ent picture emerged when we broke down the VOL 
factor into its long and short legs and analyzed low 
risk and high risk separately.
Panels B and C of Table 7 show that low risk and 
high risk each have a highly significant CAPM alpha, 
with t-statistics greater than 3. Panel B shows that, 
although the alpha of the long leg of the volatility 
factor became somewhat smaller when we controlled 
for the long legs of the other Fama–French factors, 
it remained highly significant. The main reasons are 
that the loading on the long leg of the CMA factor 
(conservative) became small and insignificant and 
that the loading on RMW hurt less because the 
RMW premium was rather small on the long side 
(1.0%; see Table 1). For the short leg of the volatility 
factor, however, the alpha vanished completely and 
even turned negative after we adjusted for expo-
sure to the short sides of other factors, as shown in 
Panel C of Table 7. A high-volatility portfolio loads 
heavily on the short legs of the RMW, CMA, and 
WML factors. 
As noted previously, high-risk stocks perform like junk 
but the performance of low-risk stocks cannot be 
attributed to “quality” features of these stocks. These 
results held when we dropped momentum from the 
regression. We carried out this same analysis but used 
BETA instead of VOL (as reported in Table A6) and 
found that, although the alphas were generally lower 
for the BETA factor, a similar asymmetry occurred 
between the long-leg and short-leg results.
Novy-Marx (2014) observed that the high-risk port-
folio is strongly tilted toward small and unprofitable 
growth companies, and our results confirm this find-
ing. The long–short results are fully driven, however, 
by this relationship on only the short side of the 
factor. The long-leg results show a completely dif-
ferent picture. Put differently, the high-risk anomaly 
may not be a distinct phenomenon, but the time-
series regression indicates that the low-risk anomaly 
is. Cross-sectional (Fama and MacBeth 1973) 
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regressions also support the notion that low risk is a 
distinct factor not explained by the five-factor model 
(see Blitz and Vidojevic 2017).
To examine the robustness of our findings, we 
repeated all the tests for the July 1963–December 
1990 subperiod and the January 1991–December 
2018 subperiod. Panel D of Table 7 shows the cor-
responding alphas and t-statistics. The results for the 
low-risk factor are very robust for both subsamples. 
In the first subperiod, the standard low-risk factor 
is not even explained by the Fama–French factors; 
Table 7. Volatility and Long Legs vs. Short Legs (t-statistics in parentheses)
Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB HML RMW CMA WML
A. VOL
CAPM 6.35% 0.00      
(4.26) (0.00)      
Six factors 0.58% 0.26 –0.28 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.03
(0.54) (11.72) (–9.14) (8.99) (13.95) (6.36) (1.22)
B. Long (low volatility)










CAPM 4.10% –0.07      
(4.46) (–4.05)      
Six factors 3.12% 0.02 –0.24 0.54 0.53 0.07 –0.19
(4.16) (1.30) (–11.50) (12.44) (7.54) (0.94) (–5.08)
C. Short (high volatility)










CAPM 2.24% 0.07      
(3.46) (5.75)      
Six factors –0.82% 0.22 –0.05 0.14 0.40 0.42 0.11
(–1.87) (21.71) (–3.97) (2.93) (13.10) (7.78) (7.53)
D. Subperiods
 1963–1990  1991–2018
VOL Long Short VOL Long Short
CAPM alpha 6.12% 3.48% 2.64%  7.20% 5.04% 2.16%
(3.76) (3.26) (3.92)  (2.96) (3.43) (1.98)
Six-factor alpha 4.20% 4.56% 0.96%  –0.48% 3.00% –1.68%
(3.10) (5.26) (1.64)  (–0.30) (2.61) (–2.37)
Notes: Panels A–C are for the full July 1963–December 2018 period. Panel A shows the long–short results for VOL, Panel B shows 
the long leg (low volatility) results, and Panel C shows the short leg (high volatility) results. Panel D shows the robustness of the 
results in the subsample periods: July 1963–December 1990 and January 1991–December 2018. 
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the unique alpha comes from the long side. In the 
second subperiod, the standard factor is explained, 
but the long side remains unexplained. Thus, the 
long side of the low-risk factor offers a consistent 
unique alpha.
The Role of Costs and Investment 
Frictions
Our results show that the long side of factor 
premiums offers stronger risk-adjusted returns than 
the short side, but that conclusion comes before 
considering the impact of transaction costs, short-
ing costs, and other implementation frictions. In 
this section, we discuss whether costs and frictions 
might lead to different conclusions. The challenge 
in such an analysis is that gauging exact transaction 
and shorting costs is hard over a sample period that 
spans more than half a century. Moreover, transac-
tion costs and shorting costs are investor specific. 
That said, several recent studies have extensively 
analyzed real-life transaction costs. Novy-Marx 
and Velikov (2016), studying the transaction costs 
of trading anomalies, found that since 1963, fol-
lowing an SMB strategy costs 5.66 basis points 
(bps) per month; HML, 5.45 bps; and WML, 48.4 
bps. Furthermore, Novy-Marx and Velikov (2019) 
showed that costs for trading anomalies in small-cap 
stocks are approximately double the costs for trad-
ing anomalies in large-cap stocks. In addition, Novy-
Marx and Velikov (2016) showed that the average 
trading costs are higher for high-volatility stocks and 
small-cap stocks. 
These studies typically focused on (effective) bid–
ask spreads—that is, costs that resemble what the 
average investor would pay. Frazzini, Israel, and 
Moskowitz (2018) challenged these estimates by 
showing that real-life trading costs are substantially 
lower for sophisticated institutional investors, who 
operate as arbitrageurs or “factor investors” in 
markets. Frazzini et al. estimated average transaction 
costs at 10 bps for large-cap stocks and 20 bps for 
small-cap stocks, regardless of whether the trade is a 
buy or a short sell. 
Because most stocks in our study were held, on aver-
age, for more than a year (the exception being stocks 
involved in a momentum factor strategy), the general 
impact of trading costs on the factor premiums we 
studied would have been limited. Furthermore, the 
added value of the long legs in small-cap stocks can 
be expected to exceed transaction costs.
Short legs also involve shorting costs, of course, 
as well as severe practical limitations historically. 
Shorting is not always feasible because of unreason-
ably high shorting costs or insufficient volume avail-
ability. Several studies have revealed that shorting 
costs can be substantial. Using data from an insti-
tutional lender in a sample covering the 2000–01 
period, D’Avolio (2002) found that the cost of bor-
rowing a value-weighted loan portfolio in that period 
was 25 bps a year. Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg 
(2013) found annual costs generally above 100 bps 
between 2003 and 2007. Porras Prado, Saffi, and 
Sturgess (2016) found average value-weighted loan 
fees of 116 bps per year between 2006 and 2010, 
but fees were 23–35 bps when the available lending 
supply was plentiful (i.e., in the top three quintiles of 
lending supply). Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) 
used proprietary lending data from a large institution 
and found average loan fees of around 400 bps for 
small-cap stocks and 40 bps for large-cap stocks in 
the 1999–2003 period. Kim and Lee (2019) reported 
a mean (median) borrowing fee for the easiest-
to-borrow stocks of 42.3 bps (37.5 bps) per year 
between 2006 and 2017. Using a similar database, 
Beneish et al. (2015) found a mean (median) loan fee 
of 33.2 bps (27.5 bps) for the 10% easiest-to-borrow 
stocks between 2004 and 2013; the amount qua-
drupled for the next 10% easiest-to-borrow stocks. 
In summary, since the 2000s, shorting costs are 
estimated to have been above 25 bps but only for 
the easily shortable large-cap stocks.
That said, several studies have found that the stocks 
that are designated for shorting by a factor strategy 
(i.e., the short legs) are the harder and more expen-
sive stocks to short. Geczy et al. (2002) showed 
that growth stocks, loser stocks, and small-cap 
stocks are significantly harder to short than other 
stocks. Drechsler and Drechsler (2016) found more 
than triple the shorting fees for the short-leg value, 
momentum, volatility-related, and profitability 
portfolios. Beneish et al. (2015) found that the short 
returns for several accounting-based anomalies are 
attributable to special stocks; the short sides of the 
profitability and investment stocks were present 
only among hard-to-borrow stocks, and their returns 
became statistically indistinguishable from zero once 
shorting costs were accounted for. Drechsler and 
Drechsler showed that shorting costs are high for 
several anomalies and that constraints on short-
ing execution substantially reduce the profitability 
on the short side; profits disappear altogether for 
stocks with low lending fees. Chu et al. (forthcoming) 
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found that relaxing short-sale constraints reduced 
the profitability of several stock anomalies by 77 bps 
per month. Kim and Lee (2019) found that shorting 
fees are twice as high for the short legs of many 
anomalies, including unprofitable, high-investment, 
and loser companies. Furthermore, they showed 
that stocks in the short legs are substantially more 
difficult to short. 
Shorting involves frictions in addition to cost and 
difficulty, such as the unavailability of stocks in the 
short leg. Beneish et al. (2015) showed that shares 
are often least available to borrow when the stocks 
are most attractive to short sellers. Kim and Lee 
(2019) showed that stocks in short legs are substan-
tially more difficult to short than those in long legs 
would be. They estimated that shorting frictions 
(i.e., the unavailability of stocks in the short leg to 
sell short, as well as loan fees actually paid to stock 
lenders), as obtained from the IHS Markit database, 
amount to 10.4 bps per month, or about 40% of the 
gross short profits for 14 anomalies. In their study, 
shorting fees amounted to 7.5 bps per month and 
unavailability costs, 2.9 bps. In summary, shorting 
costs are substantial on the short side of factor 
investing, especially when tilting to small-cap stocks. 
Overall, these results suggest that our conclusions 
are likely to strengthen when the impact of costs is 
accounted for.
A final remark is in order: Investing only in the long 
side of factors offers roughly half of the raw returns 
to be gained from the long–short approach. Thus, a 
position in the long factor legs needs to be levered 
up by approximately a factor of 2 to maintain a 
similar absolute return, and this higher leverage may 
require increased funding. Some investors face con-
straints on leverage and/or funding, and these limits 
to arbitrage might prevent them from investing only 
in the long sides of factors, even if these offer higher 
risk-adjusted returns. The long–short approach gives 
an investor more return per unit of cash, although, 
as highlighted in this article, these returns are partly 
beyond the reach of investors because of shorting 
costs and limitations.
Conclusion and Practical 
Implications
Factor portfolios are typically constructed by 
combining a long leg and a short leg under the 
assumption that the two legs are complementary 
drivers of factor premiums. We critically examined 
this assumption by decomposing five Fama–French-
style portfolios (value, momentum, profitability, 
investment, and low risk) into their long and short 
legs. We found that factor premiums originate in 
both legs but are typically stronger on the long 
side. Short legs usually add less value for inves-
tor portfolios. In fact, the short legs are generally 
subsumed by the long legs because the short legs 
provide lower risk-adjusted returns and less diversi-
fication benefit. This outcome is especially driven by 
a high common risk in short legs, as is evident from 
relatively high correlations (1) between the short 
legs of various factors and (2) between the short 
legs and long legs of individual factors. These results 
hold across large- and small-cap stocks; the long 
legs in both the large-cap space and the small-cap 
space provide most of the contribution to factor 
premiums. Our findings are robust over time, cannot 
be attributed to differences in tail risk, and hold 
internationally across various regions. In summary, 
factor premiums tend to be most attractive on the 
long side. The long legs are crucial for understand-
ing factor premiums, and no essential information is 
lost by dropping the short legs. The short legs offer 
essentially the same exposure as the long legs but 
with lower rewards. 
We also shed light on previous findings regarding 
the value and low-risk factor premiums because we 
found their correlation structures to be materially 
different on the long and short sides. Some recent 
studies have argued that these factors are subsumed 
by the new Fama–French factors—profitability and 
investment—but we showed that these new results 
are entirely driven by the short legs of the new fac-
tors. The long legs of both the value and low-risk fac-
tors offer distinct premiums that cannot be explained 
by the long legs of other factors.
Our findings have important practical implications. 
Factor premiums are present in the long and short 
legs, in both large-cap and small-cap stocks, but turn 
out to be most attractive on the long side, especially 
in small-cap stocks. Investors may thus efficiently 
capture the premiums offered by factors by focus-
ing on the long legs of factors and using highly 
liquid market index futures to hedge out the market 
exposure. Some important caveats apply, however.
First, the long-leg approach may interfere with 
investor-specific constraints—in particular, leverage 
constraints—for a given absolute-return objective. 
As a consequence, for leverage-constrained inves-
tors, shorting recognized factors may be optimal.
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Second, the impact of costs, liquidity, and capacity 
limits should be carefully accounted for. Not only 
short-leg stocks but also small-cap stocks tend to 
have higher costs and lower liquidity. Short selling 
involves stock-lending fees and missed opportunities 
from stocks that are not available for shorting, but 
the long-leg approach also involves additional costs. 
Moreover, the long-leg approach requires more lever-
age to achieve the same amount of factor exposure. 
We argue that investment frictions are unlikely to 
change our conclusions but they may alter the mag-
nitude of the performance advantage of the long legs 
over the short legs and of factor strategies in large-
cap versus small-cap stocks. That said, we stress that 
our results by no means imply that investors should 
ignore factor strategies in large-cap investing because 
these strategies offer attractive factor premiums, their 
long legs did add value in our tests, and they face 
fewer investment frictions. 
Third, the conclusions of our analysis should not 
necessarily be overgeneralized to the notion that 
shorting does not add value in general. Our analysis 
is limited to the long and short legs of five widely 
used academic factor premiums with portfolios 
constructed via standard sorting procedures. 
Although the factors in our study are widely con-
sidered to be among the most important drivers of 
stock returns, we acknowledge that hundreds of 
alternative factors have been documented and that 
some of them may obtain most of their performance 
from the short side. Also, we have not examined 
portfolios optimized at the level of individual stocks 
while accounting for various factor- or risk-based 
constraints. Follow-up research should reveal 
whether short positions can add value to models 
with long legs.







A. Long leg of q-factors
Return (%) 3.0 3.2 3.1 
Volatility (%) 3.7 3.9 2.3 
Sharpe ratio 0.80 0.82 1.35
B. Short leg of q-factors
Return (%) 2.6 3.4 3.0 
Volatility (%) 4.0 5.2 3.6 
Sharpe ratio 0.65 0.65 0.82
C. Long–short of q-factors
Return (%) 5.6 6.6 6.1 
Volatility (%) 6.3 8.7 5.1 
Sharpe ratio 0.88 0.75 1.19
Notes: These q-factors from Hou et al. (2015) are market neutral and constructed from a triple 
2×3×3 sort on size, investment to assets, and return on equity. To neutralize market and size tilts, 
each leg is an equal 50/50 combination of the large-cap leg and small-cap leg, minus the market 
(50/50 Big/Small portfolios). Panel C is the sum of Panels A and B and the classical way of present-
ing long–short factors.
Appendix A. Additional Tests
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Figure A2. Rolling 
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between Long Leg and 
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Note: The sample period is July 1963–December 2018.
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Table A2. Robustness to Definition of Factor Legs: Sharpe Ratios, July 1963–December 2018
 HML WML RMW CMA VOL All
A. Standard factors (2×3) minus equal-weighted Big and Small portfolios
Long leg 0.40 0.61 0.31 0.49 0.53 1.10
Short leg 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.54 0.69
Long–short 0.40 0.55 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.86
B. Standard factors (2×3) minus equal-weighted neutral portfolios
Long leg 0.35 0.49 0.29 0.21 0.48 0.95
Short leg 0.29 0.41 0.30 0.37 0.49 0.49
Long–short 0.40 0.55 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.86
C. Cap-weighted factors minus market portfolio
Long leg 0.41 0.59 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.81
Short leg 0.05 0.34 0.27 0.11 0.30 0.41
Long–short 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.67
D. Cap-weighted factors minus neutral portfolios
Long leg 0.38 0.45 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.88
Short leg 0.08 0.33 0.19 0.12 0.33 0.32
Long–short 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.67
Notes: The hedge portfolio in Panel A is a 50/50 mix of the Small and Big portfolios as defined in SMB; in Panel B, the hedge is a 
50/50 mix of the two neutral portfolios. Panels C and D show results for fully cap-weighted factor portfolios. The hedge portfolio 
is the cap-weighted market portfolio in Panel C and the relevant cap-weighted neutral portfolio in Panel D.
Figure A3. Rolling 
(10-Year) Alpha of Long 
Legs vs. Short Legs
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Notes: Shown is the t-value of the 10-year rolling alpha of each leg of the combined factor 
portfolio over the other leg. The sample period is July 1963–December 2018.
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Table A3.  Sharpe Ratios for Long vs. Short Legs Based on 5×5 Portfolios, 
July 1963–December 2018
 HML RMW CMA WML VOL All
Mega       
Long leg 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.24 0.67
Short leg 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.32 0.05 0.26
Long–short 0.12 0.25 0.21 0.37 0.15 0.47
Large       
Long leg 0.17 0.28 0.13 0.43 0.41 0.78
Short leg 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.46 0.38 0.42
Long–short 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.49 0.43 0.61
Mid       
Long leg 0.39 0.36 0.19 0.55 0.58 1.13
Short leg 0.35 0.25 0.44 0.47 0.66 0.59
Long–short 0.41 0.34 0.42 0.57 0.67 0.87
Small       
Long leg 0.32 0.35 0.16 0.56 0.52 1.03
Short leg 0.40 0.28 0.53 0.68 0.72 0.71
Long–short 0.41 0.36 0.50 0.71 0.67 0.96
Micro       
Long leg 0.58 –0.03 0.23 0.77 0.75 1.32
Short leg 0.71 0.40 0.97 0.87 0.88 0.99
Long–short 0.70 0.29 0.87 0.95 0.88 1.32
Note: The long leg of a factor in a size bucket is defined as the top quintile of the factor in that size bucket minus the average of the 
five quintiles in that size bucket, and the short leg of a factor in a size bucket is defined as the average of the five quintiles in that 
size bucket minus the bottom quintile of the factor in that size bucket.
Table A4.  Portfolio Optimization Results for 5×5 Portfolios, 
July 1963–December 2018
Percentage Allocation
Mega Large Mid Small Micro
A. Separate optimization
Long legs 97.6 89.1 72.8 63.1 53.9
Short legs 2.4 10.9 27.2 36.9 46.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Additive optimization
Mega +Large +Mid +Small +Micro
Long legs 97.6 93.1 81.3 78.7 67.6
Short legs 2.4 6.9 18.7 21.3 32.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Shown are the results for maximum-Sharpe-ratio optimizations based on the 5×5 portfolios 
sorted on the size factor. Each column refers to a separate optimization. For each optimization in 
Panel A, five long legs and five short legs were used as inputs. In Panel B, the process was to start from 
the megacaps segment and then add the other size segments one by one. Each cell shows the optimal 
allocation to all long legs and all short legs combined.
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Figure A4. Draw-
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Table A5. Downside Risk Perspectives, July 1963–December 2018
Long Leg Short Leg Long–Short
A. Risk
Volatility 2.2% 3.7% 5.7%
Skewness –0.1 –0.3 –0.2
Excess kurtosis 7.0 10.1 8.9
Semi-deviation 1.3% 2.4% 3.5%
VAR (95%) –2.7% –4.9% –7.3%
Maximum drawdown –10.5% –15.5% –24.2%
Regular beta –0.02 –0.08 –0.11
LPM (0) beta –0.02 –0.06 –0.08
LPM (1 sigma) beta –0.01 –0.03 –0.04
B. Return/risk
Sharpe ratio 1.10 0.69 0.86
Adjusted Sharpe ratio 0.69 0.52 0.60
Sortino ratio 1.88 1.07 1.39
Return/VAR 0.90 0.52 0.68
Notes: VAR = value at risk; LPM = lower partial moment. The data are for the long leg and short 
leg of the combined factor portfolio. Panel A shows data for volatility and various downside risk 
measurements. The LPM (0) beta is similar to the downside beta used by Ang, Chen, and Xing 
(2006), and the LPM (1 sigma) beta was used by Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber (2014). The return/
risk statistics in Panel B include measures that account for nonnormal returns. The adjusted 
Sharpe ratio corrects for skewness and kurtosis (Pézier and White 2008), and the Sortino ratio 
uses downside volatility as the risk measure.
Financial Analysts Journal | A Publication of CFA Institute

































Long Leg over Short Leg Short Leg over Long Leg
A. Sharpe Raos
Note: Data are for the multifactor long-leg, short-leg, and long–short portfolios by decade.
Table A6.  BETA and Long Legs vs. Short Legs
Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB HML RMW CMA WML
A. BETA
CAPM 5.01% 0.00      
(t-value) (3.88) (0.00)      
Six-factor –0.74% 0.20 –0.11 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.12
(t-value) (–0.69) (9.29) (–3.70) (6.72) (10.08) (6.44) (5.89)
(continued)
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B. Long legs (low beta)
Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB High Robust Conservative Winner
CAPM 2.87% –0.07      
(t-value) (3.47) (–4.51)      
Six-factor 1.28% 0.00 –0.17 0.44 0.48 0.22 –0.03
(t-value) (1.70) (–0.18) (–8.00) (10.02) (6.79) (2.93) (–0.83)
C. Short legs (high beta)
Alpha Mkt – Rf SMB Low Weak Aggressive Loser
CAPM 2.14% 0.07      
(t-value) (3.86) (6.72)      
Six-factor –0.62% 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.18
(t-value) (–1.44) (18.47) (2.62) (2.97) (6.79) (6.23) (13.79)
D. Subperiods
 
July 1963–December 1990 January 1991–December 2018
BETA Long Short BETA Long Short
CAPM alpha 5.52% 2.88% 2.64%  5.16% 3.24% 1.92%
(t-value) (3.76) (3.15) (4.47)  (2.44) (2.41) (2.06)
Six-factor alpha 2.40% 3.12% 0.48%  –2.04% 0.72% –1.32%
(t-value) (1.87) (3.68) (0.92)  (–1.23) (0.61) (–2.00)
Notes: The BETA factor replaces 36-month volatility with 36-month BETA to construct 2×3 portfolios similar to the Fama–French 
portfolios—a process identical to the construction of the VOL factor. The BETA factor resembles the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) BAB 
factor, but to address the Novy-Marx and Velikov (2018) critique, it does not give more or less weight to illiquid small caps than do the 
Fama–French factors. Panel A shows the long-leg/short-leg results (BETA); Panel B provides the long-leg (low-beta) results; Panel C 
provides the short-leg (high-beta) results. Panel D shows the robustness of the results by breaking them down into two subperiods. 
Table A6.  BETA and Long Legs vs. Short Legs (continued)
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Notes
1. See, for example, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2006, 
2008, 2012, 2015, 2016); Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
2001); Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013); Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006); Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007); and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014).
2. For example, see Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2006, 
2008, 2012, 2015, 2017) and Israel and Moskowitz (2013).
3. Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french/data_library.html.
4. See, among others, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2006, 
2008, 2012, 2015) and Israel and Moskowitz (2013).
5. For example, Fama and French (1998, 2012, 2017); Asness 
et al. (2013).
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